The Price of Disclosure in the Thoroughbred Yearling Market
Emily J. Plant and
Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, 2013, vol. 45, issue 2, 243-257
In this article, we examine disclosure as a tool to mitigate the effects of asymmetric information in a Thoroughbred yearling market. If disclosures influence market price, information contained therein must be valuable to buyers and hence diminish asymmetric information. Using public auction data, we find that disclosures do not influence price in a segment of the auction in which an implicit quality certification is available. However, in the other segment, we find evidence that some disclosures may provide valuable information to buyers.
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Journal Article: The Price of Disclosure in the Thoroughbred Yearling Market (2013)
Working Paper: The Price of Disclosure in the Thoroughbred Yearling Market (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:jagaec:v:45:y:2013:i:02:p:243-257_00
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