The Banking Crisis of 1933: Some Iowa Evidence

Lynn Muchmore

The Journal of Economic History, 1970, vol. 30, issue 3, 627-639

Abstract: Economic historians have not provided a satisfactory discussion of the banking collapse of 1933. There are two reasons for their disinterest. First, while state systems contributed 80 percent of the commercial bank failures during the crisis year, banking statistics from state authorities are erratic, difficult to consolidate, and in some cases simply not available. Second, there already exists a set of generalizations based upon contemporary accounts which provides plausible answers to most of the obvious questions. The purpose of the following article is to explore the usefulness of these generalizations by applying them to 1932–1933 failure patterns in Iowa, and to suggest further research activities which need to be undertaken in order to construct a more powerful analysis.

Date: 1970
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