Langdon Cheves and the Panic of 1819: A Reassessment

Edwin J. Perkins

The Journal of Economic History, 1984, vol. 44, issue 2, 455-461

Abstract: Langdon Cheves's role as president of the Second Bank of the United States (1819–1822) warrants reassessment. First, he did not save the bank from threatened failure, since it was, in truth, already sound. Second, he was irresponsible in accumulating huge excess reserves during the depression year of 1820; reserves estimated here as sufficient to support an increase of up to 17 percent in the volume of notes and deposits in the U.S. money supply.

Date: 1984
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