Free Banking Laws and Barriers to Entry in Banking, 1838–1860

Kenneth Ng

The Journal of Economic History, 1988, vol. 48, issue 4, 877-889

Abstract: The thesis that free banking laws lowered barriers to entry in the U.S. banking industry is tested by examining entry of firms and output of banking services before and after the institution of free banking. The output of banking services and the number of banks remained the same or declined after the institution of free banking, in all states with viable free banking laws except New York. In light of this evidence, the belief that free banking in the antebellum United States increased competition and efficiency of the banking industry by lowering barriers to entry must be reconsidered.

Date: 1988
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/ ... type/journal_article link to article abstract page (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:jechis:v:48:y:1988:i:04:p:877-889_00

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in The Journal of Economic History from Cambridge University Press Cambridge University Press, UPH, Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 8BS UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Kirk Stebbing ().