Cooperation and Rivalry in the International Steel Cartel, 1926–1933

Daniel Barbezat

The Journal of Economic History, 1989, vol. 49, issue 2, 435-447

Abstract: The International Steel Cartel of 1926 was a necessary step toward a coordinated system of cartels to govern steel exports. Like the present industrial policies of the European Community, however, differences in the aims of the domestic industries caused rivalry among the members of the 1926 agreement. Although thecartel was not able to fix its members' production shares, it was able to limit tradebetween them, which allowed for the formation and operation of their domesticcartels.

Date: 1989
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