AT&T's Strategic Response to Competition: Why Not Preempt Entry?

Joan Nix and David Gabel

The Journal of Economic History, 1993, vol. 53, issue 2, 377-387

Abstract: The idea that a monopolist would adopt a pricing strategy to deter entry is found in a wide body of research. We explore why the monopolist in the American telephone industry, AT&T, did not pursue such a strategy when its initial patents expired.

Date: 1993
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