Enforcement In Apprenticeship Contracts: Were Runaways a Serious Problem? Evidence from Montreal

Gillian Hamilton

The Journal of Economic History, 1995, vol. 55, issue 3, 551-574

Abstract: Historians argue that in late eighteenth-century North Aerica, apprentices often ran away form their masters. Masters’ inability to write enforceable contracts, the argument goes, sparked the decline of traditional apprenticeships. This article addresses the issue of enforcement. I analyze an apprentice’s incentive to run away and the role of enforcement with detailed archival evidence form Montreal. These data cast doubt on the claim that masters were unable to construct enforceable contracts and call into question the severity of a runaway problem.

Date: 1995
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