The “Rabassa Morta” in Catalan Viticulture: The Rise and Decline of a Long-Term Sharecropping Contract, 1670s–1920s

Juan Carmona () and James Simpson

The Journal of Economic History, 1999, vol. 59, issue 2, 290-315

Abstract: For long periods, and in line with recent theoretical literature, the rabassa morta sharecropping contract successfully reduced problems of moral hazard and opportunistic behavior, and provided incentives for sharecroppers to respond to market opportunities. However, from the late nineteenth century, technical change, rising wages, and weak wine prices all increased the incentives for postcontractual opportunistic behavior on the part of the sharecropper, leading to conflicts and loss of trust between the principal and agent.

Date: 1999
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Working Paper: The "rabassa morta" in Catalan viticulture: the rise and decline of a long term sharecropping contract, 1670s-1920s (1998)
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