Good Offices: Intermediation by Corporate Bodies in Early Modern French Public Finance

Mark Potter

The Journal of Economic History, 2000, vol. 60, issue 3, 599-626

Abstract: The old-regime monarchy, particularly during the reign of Louis XIV, did much of its borrowing through the mediation of privileged corporate bodies that sought lenders on the private market and then acted as guarantors against royal default. After comparing the creditors of various privileged bodies and considering the reasons why some were more successful than others in attracting a wide circle of creditors, this study argues for a reconsideration of the constitutional-absolutist dichotomy in the historiography of the early modern financial revolution.

Date: 2000
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