LEARNING TO TAX: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE OPIUM TRADE IN IRAN, 1921–1941

Bradley Hansen

The Journal of Economic History, 2001, vol. 61, issue 1, 95-113

Abstract: Rational-choice theories of the state have been used in attempts to explain how variations in policy result from differences in constraints. But these theories give little attention to how the state comes to know what the constraints are. This article provides a dramatic example of the process of discovering economic and political constraints by examining Iran's policies toward the opium trade during the reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi (1921–1941).

Date: 2001
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