The United States and GATT: A Relational Study. By Donald G. Beane. New York: Pergamon Press, 2000. Pp. ix, 296. $75.00

Colleen M. Callahan

The Journal of Economic History, 2001, vol. 61, issue 2, 580-582

Abstract: The ultimate success of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), negotiated by 27 nations in 1947, would have been hard to predict at the outset, given its lack of enforcement tools and dependence on the United States for leadership. What explains the GATT's achievements in the areas of tariff reduction and trade expansion, as argued by Donald Beane, is the adoption of a more pragmatic rather than ideological approach to problem-solving, along with a growing reliance on multilateral negotiations as the dominant position of the United States eroded. Lurking behind the scenes was the long-running battle between the U.S. Congress and the president over the role each would play in trade policy.

Date: 2001
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/ ... type/journal_article link to article abstract page (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:jechis:v:61:y:2001:i:02:p:580-582_51

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in The Journal of Economic History from Cambridge University Press Cambridge University Press, UPH, Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 8BS UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Kirk Stebbing ().