EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

The Athenian Trierarchy: Mechanism Design for the Private Provision of Public Goods

Brooks Kaiser

The Journal of Economic History, 2007, vol. 67, issue 2, 445-480

Abstract: The liturgical system in Classical Athens (479–322 BCE) privately provided public goods, including naval defense. I use it to evaluate mechanism design policies and to address uncertainties in the historical record by adding predictive economic theory to research by ancient historians. I evaluate the system's success at meeting the conflicting goals of efficiency, feasibility, and budget balance by analyzing the Athenian citizens' incentives within a game of asymmetric information. In the game, multiple equilibria occur; citizens may or may not volunteer for duty or avoid it. I relate the game theoretic findings to historical events.

Date: 2007
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/ ... type/journal_article link to article abstract page (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:jechis:v:67:y:2007:i:02:p:445-480_00

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in The Journal of Economic History from Cambridge University Press Cambridge University Press, UPH, Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 8BS UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Kirk Stebbing ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:cup:jechis:v:67:y:2007:i:02:p:445-480_00