Why Are Modern Bureaucracies Special? State Support to Private Firms in Early Eighteenth-Century France

Jean Beuve, Eric Brousseau and Jérôme Sgard

The Journal of Economic History, 2017, vol. 77, issue 4, 1144-1176

Abstract: The Bureau du Commerce allocated rights and rents to private entrepreneurs via a mix of hierarchical division of labor and peer-based collegial deliberation. This set-up reflected an attempt to maximize information and expertise, but also allowed for the recognition of private rights and social interests. The final decisions of the Bureau (for or against each demand), and the qualitative arguments brought forward during the procedure, are robust predictors of eventual decisions. We see this result as an indication that impersonal, rational and informed decision-making could be obtained even within a patrimonialist, rent-seeking State.

Date: 2017
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Working Paper: Why Are Modern Bureaucracies Special? State Support to Private Firms in Early-Eighteenth Century France (2017)
Working Paper: Why Are Modern Bureaucracies Special? State Support to Private Firms in Early-Eighteenth Century France (2017)
Working Paper: Why Are Modern Bureaucracies Special? State Support to Private Firms in Early-Eighteenth Century France (2017)
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