State Formation and Bureaucratization: Evidence from Pre-Imperial China
Joy Chen
The Journal of Economic History, 2024, vol. 84, issue 3, 690-726
Abstract:
This paper studies the relationship between military conflicts and state-building in pre-imperial China. I develop an incomplete contract model to examine rulers’ and local administrators’ incentives in conflict. Defensive wars drive decentralization: landowning local administrators have more to gain from a successful defense and are therefore more committed to it. Offensive wars drive centralization: the landowning ruler has personnel control over the non-land-owning local administrator and can therefore force the latter to participate in less lucrative attacks. Model predictions are corroborated with empirical evidence and historical case studies, and offer broader implications for the political divergence between China and Europe.
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:jechis:v:84:y:2024:i:3:p:690-726_2
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