The Political Economy of Commodity Cartel Formation: The Case of Coffee, 1930–1940

Christian Robles-Baez, Luis Fernando Medina and Marcelo Bucheli

The Journal of Economic History, 2025, vol. 85, issue 4, 1066-1100

Abstract: We inquire how a commodity cartel is created by studying the negotiations between Colombia and Brazil to stabilize the international coffee market in the 1930s. We show how differences among actors involved in the industry within the negotiating countries in terms of land ownership and type of coffee produced, prevented early cartelization agreements. Cartelization was only achieved when four factors converged: financial and infrastructural capability to store excess production, in-depth knowledge of the industry by the negotiating parties, full government support, and presence of a third-party enforcer. We combine an innovative game-theoretic approach with previously unexplored archival sources.

Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/ ... type/journal_article link to article abstract page (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:jechis:v:85:y:2025:i:4:p:1066-1100_5

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in The Journal of Economic History from Cambridge University Press Cambridge University Press, UPH, Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 8BS UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Kirk Stebbing ().