The Her in Inheritance: How Marriage Matching Has Always Mattered, Quebec 1800–1970

Matthew Curtis

The Journal of Economic History, 2026, vol. 86, issue 1, 38-66

Abstract: When did marriage become strongly assortative? I use a uniquely suitable database from Quebec 1800–1970 to provide the long-run perspective necessary to answer this question. First, I develop a novel method that reveals that marriage was highly assortative as far back as the early nineteenth century. Next, I show this matching depends on the individual human capital of women, not just on family backgrounds. Finally, I show that mothers had an effect on child outcomes independent of the fathers. Thus, despite deeply conservative gender norms, marriage matching—and women—have always mattered for social mobility.

Date: 2026
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Working Paper: The her in inheritance: how marriage matching has always mattered, Quebec 1800-1970 (2022)
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