An Empirical Examination of Models of Contract Choice in Initial Public Offerings

Ivo Welch

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 1991, vol. 26, issue 4, 497-518

Abstract: This study examines initial public offering contract choice decisions. In best-efforts offerings, minimum sales constraints allow issuers to precommit to withdraw the offering if a fixed minimum number of shares is not sold. In firm-commitment offerings, the over-allotment option allows the underwriter to increase sales when demand is strong. Two theories of contract choice–Benveniste and Spindt (1989) and Ritter's (1987) extension of Rock (1986)–offer predictions about the role of these contract features. We find that the 1977–1982 evidence is consistent with Benveniste and Spindt (1989). The evidence is less supportive of the Ritter (1987) hypothesis that minimum sales constraints serve to reduce the winner's curse of the riskier issuers.

Date: 1991
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