Electoral rule choice in transitional economies

Jessica Clement

Journal of Institutional Economics, 2016, vol. 12, issue 4, 895-919

Abstract: The Arab Spring and subsequent global unrest sparked a debate about whether a fourth wave of democracy emerged in the global political arena starting in 2010. A key issue arises from these emerging democracies, or ‘countries in transition’, about what types of government institutions will be adopted by the new democracies. The previous literature on advanced democracies shows the economic structure of a nation impacted its choice of electoral rule system. This paper looks at what determines electoral rule choice in transitional nations. Using a panel database with 65 transitional countries with data for 18 years (1995 to 2012), this paper tests the argument that more coordinated market economies (CMEs) tend to adopt more proportional representative electoral rule systems during a political transition. Findings show that countries characterized as CMEs due to widespread primary education, which supports co-specific assets, and prominent industrial sectors have more proportional electoral rule systems.

Date: 2016
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