Political institutions and financial cooperative development
Journal of Institutional Economics, 2017, vol. 13, issue 2, 467-498
This paper analyses the influence of political institutions on the development of financial cooperatives. It proposes a political economy theory where autocratic regimes deliberately oppose the development of a well-functioning financial cooperative sector to maintain their political influence, and prevent the formation of strong pressure groups that can threaten the current political status quo and reduce the governing elitesâ€™ economic benefits from underdeveloped and exclusive financial sector. Using panel data from 65 developing countries from 1995â€“2014, the results show that democracy, political rights and civil liberties promote financial cooperative development. These results are robust in controlling for endogeneity as well as other economic and institutional factors.
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