Economics at your fingertips  

Exploring the (behavioural) political economy of nudging

Christian Schubert ()

Journal of Institutional Economics, 2017, vol. 13, issue 3, 499-522

Abstract: In recent years, a novel, specifically institutional approach to public regulation has become popular, particularly in the Anglo-Saxon world: ‘Libertarian Paternalism’ promises to tackle society's problems in a way that increases welfare without compromising people's freedom and autonomy. The key instrument advanced by this programme is nudges. Although nudges’ ethical quality has been discussed at length, the political economy driving their implementation by self-interested (and possibly boundedly rational) policy makers and bureaucrats has been largely neglected so far. This paper elaborates on how this gap might be filled.

Date: 2017
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link) ... type/journal_article link to article abstract page (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Institutional Economics from Cambridge University Press Cambridge University Press, UPH, Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 8BS UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Keith Waters ().

Page updated 2021-09-26
Handle: RePEc:cup:jinsec:v:13:y:2017:i:03:p:499-522_00