Exploring the (behavioural) political economy of nudging
Christian Schubert ()
Journal of Institutional Economics, 2017, vol. 13, issue 3, 499-522
In recent years, a novel, specifically institutional approach to public regulation has become popular, particularly in the Anglo-Saxon world: â€˜Libertarian Paternalismâ€™ promises to tackle society's problems in a way that increases welfare without compromising people's freedom and autonomy. The key instrument advanced by this programme is nudges. Although nudgesâ€™ ethical quality has been discussed at length, the political economy driving their implementation by self-interested (and possibly boundedly rational) policy makers and bureaucrats has been largely neglected so far. This paper elaborates on how this gap might be filled.
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