Horizontal â€œchecks and balancesâ€ in the socialist regime: the party chief and mayor template
Journal of Institutional Economics, 2020, vol. 16, issue 1, 65-82
JÃ¡nos Kornai's pioneering scholarship examined the mechanisms of the socialist system. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kornai's main focus was on the transition process in former socialist countries in central Eastern Europe. This paper builds on Kornai's work on the socialist system by analyzing horizontal bargaining within every political branch in contemporary China. I argue that this horizontal bargaining within the party is enhanced by the vertical bargaining. Incorporating Kornai's work on socialism, the â€œparty chief and mayorâ€ template extends the bargaining model from one key figure and one group in the â€œking and councilâ€ template to two key figures and their respective confidants. In addition, it incorporates institutional constraints into the graphical model. It also defines a â€œcollective decision probability function,â€ which shows how the party chief and mayor model reaches â€œchecks and balancesâ€ that limit the policy space, regardless of whether the policy is exogenous or endogenous.
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/ ... type/journal_article link to article abstract page (text/html)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:jinsec:v:16:y:2020:i:1:p:65-82_6
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in Journal of Institutional Economics from Cambridge University Press Cambridge University Press, UPH, Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 8BS UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Keith Waters ().