Desertion as theft
Ennio Emanuele Piano () and
Journal of Institutional Economics, 2020, vol. 16, issue 2, 169-183
To be effective, an army must contain the extent of desertion among its ranks. This phenomenon rose to particular prominence in Europe during the 18th and 19th centuries, with the appearance of the figure of the â€œcitizen-soldierâ€ on the battlefield. This paper offers the first theoretical treatment of the issue of desertion from an economic perspective. Building on the work of Yoram Barzel on the â€œeconomic analysis of property rights,â€ we develop a â€œdesertion as theftâ€ framework. We then test the empirical implications of the framework against qualitative and quantitative evidence from Napoleonic France.
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/ ... type/journal_article link to article abstract page (text/html)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:jinsec:v:16:y:2020:i:2:p:169-183_5
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in Journal of Institutional Economics from Cambridge University Press Cambridge University Press, UPH, Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 8BS UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Keith Waters ().