On mechanisms of meritocratic recruitment: competence and impartiality

Palina Kolvani and Marina Nistotskaya

Journal of Institutional Economics, 2025, vol. 21, -

Abstract: Research shows that meritocratic recruitment (MR) in public administration is positively related to improved government performance and developmental outcomes. However, the mechanisms behind these improvements remain understudied theoretically and empirically. This paper addresses this gap by theorising and testing two simultaneous pathways through which MR influences development outcomes. First, by prioritising competence over nepotism or political expedience, MR enhances the epistemic quality of bureaucratic personnel (the competence mechanism). Second, by creating incentive misalignment between bureaucrats and politicians, it enables bureaucrats to resist undue political influence, prioritise public interests in governance, and ultimately contribute to development (the impartiality mechanism). Applying mediation analysis to fourteen years of cross-national data, we examine whether changes in recruitment systems are associated with competence- and impartiality-laden indicators of government performance and developmental outcomes. The findings provide robust empirical support for these mechanisms, advancing theoretical understanding and empirical insights into the effects of MR.

Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:jinsec:v:21:y:2025:i::p:-_12

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