Governing internet address resources: Regional Internet Registries and the resilience of a polycentric system

Dominique Lazanski and Ilia Murtazashvili

Journal of Institutional Economics, 2026, vol. 22, -

Abstract: This paper examines how Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) function as self-governing institutions for managing Internet address resources and what episodes of stress reveal about the resilience and vulnerabilities of this system. Our analysis offers an institutional assessment of the RIR system and evaluates how it has responded to scarcity, technological change, and market pressures. We argue that the RIR model endures because its rules reflect Ostromian principles, including clearly defined boundaries, community participation, and credible monitoring, that sustain cooperation. Using these principles as normative benchmarks, we identify pathways for reform that preserve the RIRs’ decentralized, member-driven governance institutions while strengthening transparency, adaptability, and cross-regional resilience.

Date: 2026
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:jinsec:v:22:y:2026:i::p:-_30

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