Verified pseudonymity as governance technology: decentralized identity, soulbound tokens, and online discourse

Christos A. Makridis

Journal of Institutional Economics, 2026, vol. 22, e32

Abstract: Cheap, disposable online identities make abuse easier to externalize. Users can harass, evade bans, amplify content through fake accounts, or abandon a damaged reputation at low cost, while other users, moderators, and platforms bear the consequences. This paper examines verified pseudonymity as an institutional response to that problem. First, I model online communities as club-governed informational commons in which incivility degrades the shared environment and raises enforcement costs. The model shows that conduct can improve when sanctions attach to a persistent pseudonymous identity and when users have future access, reputation, or governance rights at stake. Second, I compare verified pseudonymity with open pseudonymity, real-name mandates, centralized know-your-customer verification, algorithmic moderation, and no intervention. Decentralized identifiers, verifiable credentials, proof of personhood, and non-transferable standing credentials matter because they can separate authentication from public identification. Third, I add a community-currency layer that separates access to scarce attention from governance rights. The result is a governance framework in which accountability depends less on public naming than on durable standing, credible sanctions, and reusable privacy-preserving credentials.

Date: 2026
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