Top executive pay in Spanish banking system

Idoya Ferrero-Ferrero, María Ángeles Fernández-Izquierdo and María Jesús Muñoz-Torres
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Idoya Ferrero Ferrero

Journal of Management & Organization, 2014, vol. 20, issue 3, 333-347

Abstract: This study examines consistency between compensation systems and corporate performance. The main purpose is to analyse how the performance has affected the short-term executive pay in Spanish banking system during the period 2004–2008. The main results reveal that pay-performance sensitivity is asymmetrical regarding the sign of the variation of the performance, since the pay-performance sensitivity is greater when the variation of the results is positive than when the variation of the results is negative. This finding is consistent with the managerial power theory and calls into question the role of the pay-performance incentives to align interest of executives and shareholders.

Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:jomorg:v:20:y:2014:i:03:p:333-347_00

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