On Pricing Unconventional Prepaid Forward Contracts: Evidence from en primeur Fine Wine

Marcin Czupryna, Michał Jakubczyk and Paweł Oleksy

Journal of Wine Economics, 2019, vol. 14, issue 4, 400-408

Abstract: An en primeur agreement is an unconventional forward contract. In this article, we provide a new conceptual framework for analyzing the properties of en primeur prices based on the cost of carry approach. The results, based upon Bayesian modeling, indicate that the cost of carry increases up to 0.9598 when en primeur and bottled wines are traded in parallel. Moreover, our findings confirm that price dispersion around the mean value is greater for en primeur wines (22.42%) than for standard bottled wines (8.2%) traded after the sale of en primeur wines has ended. (JEL Classifications: G12, G15, L66, Q02)

Date: 2019
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:jwecon:v:14:y:2019:i:4:p:400-408_7

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