Public Finance, Special Interests, and Direct Wine Shipping Laws in the United States*

Omer Gokcekus and Dennis Nottebaum

Journal of Wine Economics, 2012, vol. 7, issue 1, 35-48

Abstract: This study develops thirteen criteria to detail diverging direct shipping laws of the U.S. states. It also investigates why some states have prohibitive laws by utilizing a logit regression model. Regression results provide strong support for public finance and special interest arguments: It appears that states concerned about incurring losses in tax revenues, that is, that are heavily dependent on federal aid and have low state revenues, and protecting the wholesalers and retailers that benefit from the three-tier system (at the expense of wineries and wine drinkers) are most likely to have a prohibitive law. (JEL Classification: D72, H71, Q18)

Date: 2012
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