The Uncovered Set and the Limits of Legislative Action
William T. Bianco,
Ivan Jeliazkov () and
Political Analysis, 2004, vol. 12, issue 3, 256-276
We present a simulation technique for sorting out the size, shape, and location of the uncovered set to estimate the set of enactable outcomes in â€œreal-worldâ€ social choice situations, such as the contemporary Congress. The uncovered set is a well-known but underexploited solution concept in the literature on spatial voting games and collective choice mechanisms. We explain this solution concept in nontechnical terms, submit some theoretical observations to improve our theoretical grasp of it, and provide a simulation technique that makes it possible to estimate this set and thus enable a series of tests of its empirical relevance.
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