Comparing Models of Strategic Choice: The Role of Uncertainty and Signaling

Jonathan Wand

Political Analysis, 2006, vol. 14, issue 1, 101-120

Abstract: Testing the fit of competing equilibrium solutions to extensive form games crucially depends on assumptions about the distribution of player types. To illustrate the importance of these assumptions for differentiating standard statistical models of strategic choice, I draw on a game previously analyzed by Lewis and Schultz (2003). The differences that they highlight between a pair of perfect Bayesian equilibrium and quantal response equilibrium models are not produced by signaling and updating dynamics as claimed, but are instead produced by different assumptions about the distribution of player types. The method of analysis developed and the issues raised are applicable to a broad range of structural models of conflict and bargaining.

Date: 2006
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