La evoluciÃ³n institucional del despido en espaÃ±a: una interpretaciÃ³n en tÃ©rminos de un accidente histÃ³rico*
Miguel Malo ()
Revista de Historia Económica / Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History, 2005, vol. 23, issue 1, 83-115
In this article, we present an analysis of the institutional evolution of firing in Spain. We explain how a certain path-dependence has been created by historical accidents and how this is the mechanism behind the current system of a costly employment at will. The incentives of firms, workers and governments to sustain such a system are also discussed. We show the main inefficiencies of the system: a substantial increase in severance pay, a distorted use of the legal framework, and limitations to give a rapid answer to a big negative shock. Finally, we discuss how the unemployment benefits reform of 2002 can be understood as the culmination of Spain's policy of costly employment at will.
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:reveco:v:23:y:2005:i:01:p:83-115_01
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