National Treatment and WTO Dispute Settlement

Rajesh Pillai

World Trade Review, 2002, vol. 1, issue 3, 321-343

Abstract: The tension between the WTO and its constituent States and the conflicting impulses of trade liberalization and domestic regulatory autonomy is well documented. This phenomenon is brought into stark relief by the perceived interference from WTO dispute settlement panels into fiscal and regulatory policy-making within States. It is clear that the GATT and GATS agreements do in fact mandate a high degree of policing by WTO panels in areas that were traditionally seen as the exclusive sovereign preserve of States.

Date: 2002
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