TOO BIG TO FAIL DOCTRINE AND THE FINANCIAL SAFETY NET

Irina Kazandzhieva-Yordanova
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Irina Kazandzhieva-Yordanova: UNWE

Economic Archive, 2017, issue 1 Year 2017, 15-35

Abstract: The global financial crisis of 2007-2009 has revealed the negative effects of the TBTF doctrine and the need to take measures to limit government intervention in cases of insolvency of systemically important banks. In the EU, such measures were taken mostly in the supervision of systemically important banks, the capital requirements, the capacity of banks to absorb losses by using domestic resources, and deposit gurantee schemes. The study focuses on the development of a financial safety net. Priority is given to deposit guarantee schemes, which are an essential component of the financial safety net. The evolution of deposit guarantee schemes is studied and an analysis of its impact on the TBTF doctrine is made. The survey has shown that the development of deposit insurance has contradictory effects on the TBTF doctrine.

Keywords: systemically important banks; deposit guarantee schemes; financial safety net; TBTF; depositors (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dat:earchi:y:2017:i:1:p:15-35

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