Payoffs in Non-Differentiable Perfectly Competitive TU Economies

Ori Haimanko ()

Economics Bulletin, 2001, vol. 28, issue 8, A0

Abstract: We show that a single-valued solution of non-atomic finite-type market games (or perfectly competitive TU economies underlying them) is uniquely determined as the Mertens value by four plausible value-related axioms. Since the Mertens value is always in the core of an economy, this result provides an axiomatization of a core-selection (or, alternatively, a competitive payoff selection).

JEL-codes: C7 D5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-04-01
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Journal Article: Payoffs in Nondifferentiable Perfectly Competitive TU Economies (2002)
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