Random Matching and assignment under dichotomous preferences

Herve Moulin and Anna Bogomolnaia

Economics Bulletin, 2001, vol. 28, issue 19, A0

Abstract: We consider bilateral matching problems where each person views those on the other side of the market as either acceptable or unacceptable: an acceptable mate is preferred to remaining single, and the latter to an unacceptable mate all acceptable mates are welfare-wise identical. Using randomization, many efficient and fair matching methods define strategyproof revelation mechanisms. Randomly selecting a priority ordering of the participants gives a simple example. Equalizing as much as possible the probability of getting an acceptable mate accross all participants stands out for its normative and incentives properties: the profile of probabilities is Lorenz dominant, and the revelation mechanism is groupstrategyproof for each side of the market. Our results apply to the random assignment problem as well.

JEL-codes: D6 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-10-18
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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