Axiomatic characterization of aggregation rules based on consent

Somdeb Lahiri

Economics Bulletin, 2001, vol. 28, issue 20, A0

Abstract: In this paper we provide axiomatic chracterzations of the Liberal Rule and the Quota Rule for voting problems where the consent of the candidate is also a factor determining whether the candidate is selected or not.

JEL-codes: D0 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-10-29
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