Multilateral negotiations with private side-deals: a multiplicity example

Roberto Serrano and Sandeep Baliga ()

Economics Bulletin, 2001, vol. 3, issue 1, 1-7

Abstract: We study a multilateral negotiation procedure that allows for "partial agreements" in which responders are told only their own shares. Applications of our model include negotiations under "joint and several liability." Unlike previous models of multilateral bargaining with exit, we find that there are multiple equilibrium outcomes.

Keywords: imperfect; information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-02-19
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/EB/2001/Volume3/EB-01C70003A.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-01c70003

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Economics Bulletin from AccessEcon
Bibliographic data for series maintained by John P. Conley ().