A note of revenue maximization and efficiency in multi-object auctions

Philippe Jehiel () and Benny Moldovanu ()

Economics Bulletin, 2001, vol. 3, issue 2, 1-5

Abstract: Combining the result of Palfrey (1983) about the role of bundling and the revenue equivalence theorem, this note shows that there is a conflict between revenue maximization and efficiency in multi-object auctions even with symmetric bidders.

Keywords: efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-04-30
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Related works:
Working Paper: A note on revenue maximization and efficiency in multi-object auctions (1999)
Working Paper: A Note on Revenue Maximization and Efficiency in Multi-Object Auctions (1999)
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