On the existence of self-enforcing equilibria

Antonio Quesada

Economics Bulletin, 2001, vol. 3, issue 5, 1-5

Abstract: It is argued that if an out-of-equilibrium player observing a deviation from a presumed strategically stable path of play believes that a player also observing the deviation is more likely to deviate than a player who does not observe the deviation then it is possible to justify, in some extensive form game, the non-existence of a self-enforcing equilibrium.

Keywords: Extensive; form; game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-07-06
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