Dependence in Private Values and Efficiency in Bilateral Trade

Georgia Kosmopoulou

Economics Bulletin, 2001, vol. 3, issue 9, 1-7

Abstract: In a bargaining model with dependent private information, I extend the result on existence of efficient mechanisms allowing any distribution of the surplus among traders. This generalization introduces flexibility into the model since full surplus extraction by one trader is incompatible with ex post individual rationality.

Keywords: Bilateral; Trade (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-08-15
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/EB/2001/Volume3/EB-01C70008A.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-01c70008

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Economics Bulletin from AccessEcon
Bibliographic data for series maintained by John P. Conley ().