Taxation and international oligopoly

Gareth Myles ()

Economics Bulletin, 2001, vol. 8, issue 4, 1-9

Abstract: The combined use of specific and ad valorem taxation as a policy response to the welfare losses caused by international oligopoly is explored. With Nash competition between countries, taxation is inferior to quantity control. In contrast, when countries cooperate production control and taxation lead to identical outcomes. If a single country regulates the oligopoly, taxation can strictly dominate production control.

Keywords: oligopoly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H0 H2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-09-04
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