Financial Intermediation and Entry-Deterrence: A survey

Leonard Mirman, Thomas Jeitschko and Neelam Jain ()

Economics Bulletin, 2001, vol. 12, issue 1, 1-13

Abstract: In this paper, we summarize the findings of a series of our papers on the relationship between financial contracting and the game of entry-deterrence in a dynamic context.The incumbent has private information about its cost and enters into an agency relationship with a lender in each of the two periods. We examine the effect of this agency relationship on the probability of entry and limit pricing on the one hand and the effect of the game of entry-deterrence on the form of the financial contract on the other. The three papers make different assumptions about the uncertainty of demand and the informational structure.

JEL-codes: L0 L1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-06-18
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