On the strategic choice of spatial price policy: the role of the pricing game rules

Iñaki Aguirre and Ana Maria Martín Arroyuelos

Economics Bulletin, 2001, vol. 12, issue 2, 1-7

Abstract: The strategic choice of spatial price policy under duopoly crucially depends on the rules of price competition. We show that under simultaneous price competition and under leader-follower price competition (with the discriminatory firm being the leader), the pricing policy game is not, as stated by Thisse and Vives (1988), a Prisoner's Dilemma.

JEL-codes: D4 L1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-07-25
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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