On the choice of incentives in firms: influence activity, monitoring technology and organizational structure
Marco Delmastro ()
Economics Bulletin, 2002, vol. 12, issue 2, 1-13
Economists have offered a number of explanations on the introduction of monetary incentives within firms. These range from the classical agency model to the impact exerted by factors such as monitoring technology, influence activity and organizational structure. Numerous empirical contributions have recently provided evidence on part of this literature, especially as concerned the trade-off between incentives and insurance. However there is still much to do in order to offer a complete picture of firm's incentive system. The purpose of this paper is to provide a test to factors that have been usually underrepresented in empirical work but that may be key in favoring or inhibiting the introduction of performance bonuses.
Keywords: influence; activity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L2 D2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-01l20002
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in Economics Bulletin from AccessEcon
Bibliographic data for series maintained by John P. Conley ().