International best-shot public goods and foreign aid

Xiaopeng Xu ()
Additional contact information
Xiaopeng Xu: University of California-Berkeley

Economics Bulletin, 2002, vol. 3, issue 13, 1-4

Abstract: This note corrects an analytical mistake of Jayaraman and Kanbur (1999) in their analysis of a Stackelberg game of the voluntary contribution to an international best-shot public good by a donor and a recipient. It shows that, depending on players' preferences, the donor may choose not to contribute but make a positive direct income transfer to the recipient who will then contribute to the best-shot public good.

Keywords: best-shot; public; goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-07-17
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/EB/2002/Volume3/EB-02C70007A.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-02c70007

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Economics Bulletin from AccessEcon
Bibliographic data for series maintained by John P. Conley ().