Existence of subgame perfect equilibrium with public randomization: A short proof
Arthur Robson () and
Philip Reny ()
Economics Bulletin, 2002, vol. 3, issue 24, 1-8
Consider a multi-stage game where each player has a compact choice set and payoffs are continuous in all such choices. Harris, Reny and Robson (1995) prove existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium as long as a public correlation device is added to each stage. They achieve this by showing that the subgame perfect equilibium path correspondence is upper hemicontinuous. The present paper gives a short proof of existence that focuses on equilibrium payoffs rather than paths.
Keywords: Existence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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