Economics at your fingertips  

Existence of subgame perfect equilibrium with public randomization: A short proof

Arthur Robson () and Philip Reny ()

Economics Bulletin, 2002, vol. 3, issue 24, 1-8

Abstract: Consider a multi-stage game where each player has a compact choice set and payoffs are continuous in all such choices. Harris, Reny and Robson (1995) prove existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium as long as a public correlation device is added to each stage. They achieve this by showing that the subgame perfect equilibium path correspondence is upper hemicontinuous. The present paper gives a short proof of existence that focuses on equilibrium payoffs rather than paths.

Keywords: Existence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-10-11
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link) (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Economics Bulletin from AccessEcon
Bibliographic data for series maintained by John P. Conley ().

Page updated 2019-04-20
Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-02c70016