The effect of the status quo tie-breaking rule on prize winning

Xiaopeng Xu ()
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Xiaopeng Xu: University of California-Berkeley

Economics Bulletin, 2002, vol. 4, issue 2, 1-5

Abstract: This paper considers a contest in which two identical players participate to compete for an indivisible prize. It is shown that, in the presence of incomplete information, the player favored by the status quo tie-breaking rule may be less likely to get the prize than his competitor, even though, under the coin toss tie-breaking rule, the two players participate with the same positive probability and hence are equally likely to get the prize.

JEL-codes: C7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-01-18
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