Status, environmental externality, and optimal tax programs

Ron Wendner

Economics Bulletin, 2003, vol. 8, issue 5, 1-10

Abstract: This paper studies the designs of optimal tax programs in OLG economies when first, consumption of one household lowers (status) utility of others, and second, consumption harms the environment. Status seeking raises optimal consumption tax rates, and lowers optimal tax rates on capital income.

Keywords: consumption; tax (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D1 H2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-01-30
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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