On potential maximization as a refinement of Nash equilibrium
Rodney Garratt () and
Cheng-Zhong Qin ()
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Cheng-Zhong Qin: University of California, Santa Barbara
Economics Bulletin, 2003, vol. 3, issue 12, 1-11
We specify an adjustment process that converges to the set of potential-maximizing strategy profiles for 3-player cooperation-formation games or n-player cooperation-formation games based on a superadditive characteristic function. Our analysis provides a justification for potential maximization as a refinement of Nash equilibrium in these settings.
Keywords: adjustment; process. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-03c70001
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