On cooperation structures resulting from simultaneous proposals

Rodney Garratt and Cheng-Zhong Qin ()
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Cheng-Zhong Qin: University of California, Santa Barbara

Economics Bulletin, 2003, vol. 3, issue 5, 1-9

Abstract: This paper looks at cooperation structures that result from a strategic game where players make simultaneous proposals for cooperation. We identify cooperation structures that maximize the potential of the game, and show how the outcome of potential maximization depends on the players' Shapley values. We do not assume superadditivity and hence, potential-maximizing strategy profiles do not always involve full cooperation. In cases where full cooperation does result from potential maximization it can be inefficient. An example provides intuition.

Keywords: cooperation; formation; game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-03-28
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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